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Saving and Endogenous Grovth: A Survey of Theory and Policy 
Abstract 
The paper surveys and extends recent results on"the effect of changes in 
government fiscal and financial policy and in private savings behavior on 
economic growth. Private saving behavior is represented by an OLG model. The 
supply side of the model permits endogenous growth through aggregate constant 
returns to an augmentable input. Private sector behavior is parameterized 
with the time preference rate, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, 
the birth rate, the death rate and the rate at which labor productivity 
declines with age. Fiscal instruments include public consumption spending, 
the capital income tax rate, deficit financing and balanced-budget 




The study of saving behavior has been a central theme of economics since 
the days the subject was known as political economy. This paper aims to 
provide a broad-ranging survey of some of the key issues involving the 
determinants of the savings rate and the consequences of different kinds of 
savings behavior for economic growth. It brings together and in minor ways 
extends results on overlapping generations (0LG) models and endogenous growth 
by Alogoskoufis and van der Ploeg [1990a,b, 1991], Saint-Paul [1990], Jones 
and Manuelli [1990] and Buiter and Kletzer [1991a,b,c]. 
Saving behavior, abstaining from current consumption, is one of two key 
determinants of economic growth. The other is the efficiency with which the 
resources that are saved are invested, that is, channeled into and allocated 
among alternative productive uses. This paper will focus exclusively on the 
first issue: how much is saved. The view that saving .is a key determinant of 
long-run potential output growth has not been popular since the early 60's 
when the empirical study of aggregate production functions purported to show 
that the output elasticity of physical capital was low and that technological 
change, which was modeled as exogenous, accounted for a large fraction of the 
growth of output per worker (Solow [1957]). 
A broader view of what constitutes investment, which encompasses R&D, 
additions to the stock of knowledge and human capital accumulation (formal and 
informal education, on the job training etc.) has necessitated a broader view 
of what constitutes saving. Technical change has been endogenized and our 
view of the role of saving in the growth process has been correspondingly 
broadened. Vhere the old "exogenous growth" literature attributed to saving 
behavior at most a permanent effect on the level of per capita income but only 
2 
a transitory effect on the rate of growth of per capita income, the new 
"endogenous growth" lit~rature implies that differences in saving behaviour 
will have permanent effects both on growth rates and levels of per capita 
income. (See e.g. Romer [1986, 1990], Lucas [1988], Barro [1990], Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin [1990], Sala-i-Martin [1991a,b], Grossman and Helpman [1991] and 
Helpman [1991]). 
The issue can be put very simply. The aggregate production function for 
the economy we are considering is linear in the aggregate capital stock, that 
is Y = aK, where Y is real output, K is the aggregate capital stock and a is 
some positive constant. Consider a closed economy without government. 
Capital depreciation is ignored. Lets denote the ratio of private saving to 
output. It follows that the growth rate of capital (and thus of output) is 
K y
given by K =y = sa. 
With constant returns to a factor (or to factors) that can be 
accumulated, anything that raises the savings rates or the productivity of 
the accumulated factor(s) a will raise the growth rate of the economy. This 
paper focuses on the determinants of s. The determinants of a are not 
considered. 
Differences in savings behaviour may be due to a variety of factors. One 
important set of determinants of saving are private preferences, that is 
private attitudes towards intertemporal choice. In standard neo-classical 
theory this is captured in such features of the preference ordering as the 
psychological or subjective pure rate of time preference, the intertemporal 
elasticity of substitution, attitudes towards intergenerational gifts and 
bequests and the parameters governing the precautionary demand for saving. 1 A 
second set of influences on private sector saving behaviour is the nature of 
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private sector anticipations concerning future asset returns and after-tax 
non-asset income.· These can range all the way from Muth-rational expectations 
to myopic, adaptive or other behavioral hypotheses. 
Demographic features constitute a third set of influences on private 
saving behaviour. Vhile the current age composition of the population must to 
a large extent be viewed as predetermined, that is, not subject to current 
public or private choice, its evolution over time will be influenced by 
private choices impinging on birth and death rates. Government policy too can 
influence the evolution of the demographic structure, both directly and by 
influencing private choices co-determining birth and death rates. 
Finally, even for a given demographic structure, government policy can 
influence both the private and the total national (private plus public) saving 
rate. This can be done though policies involving redistribution among 
heterogeneous consumers (such as deficit financing and unfunded social 
security retirement schemes) and through policies that alter the opportunity 
cost of saving. 
Endogenous growth theory has amplified the effects of changes in 
parameters and exogenous variables.2 Since the impact of policy on long-run 
growth has slipped a derivative, special attention will be given in this paper 
to the way in which economic policy influences saving. Among the policy 
instruments that will be considered are unfunded social security retirement 
schemes, deficit finance, the taxation of wage and non-wage income, interest 
taxes and subsidies and public consumption spending. The relationship between 
private and public saving (the financial crowding out issue) has of course 
long been a central theme of macroeconomics. 
The linearity of the aggregate production function in the aggregate 
capital stock represents a considerable simplification the global dynamics of 
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capital, output and consumption, when compared to the neoclassical exogenous 
growth model with consta.nt returns to capital and the non-augmentable factor 
labor jointly. As will become clear in Section VI, by expressing stocks and 
flows as ratios to the capital stock, the dynamic analysis involves one fewer 
state variable than the corresponding exogenous growth model. The model is 
therefore a useful didactic tool for a first introduction to growth theory. 
Limitations of space restrict the scope of this paper to the link between 
saving and long-term growth. This means in particular that I omit 
consideration of the cyclical relationship between private and public saving 
behavior and private investment, and of the role of fiscal and financial 
stabilization policy. The separation of the saving decision from the 
investment decision in modern capitalist economies with, to a first 
approximation, households doing the saving (in the form of accumulation of 
financial assets) and firms making the capital accumulation and R &D 
decisions, creates the possibility of intertemporal coordination failure, 
where the ex-post balancing of saving and investment occurs at a socially 
inefficient level. Asymmetric information between borrowers (investing firms) 
and lenders (saving households) may result in incompleteness of the set of 
contingent forward markets. Financial intermediaries may emerge that help 
overcome or at least mitigate the failure of market prices to convey all 
information necessary for efficient saving and investment decisions. If this 
is not privately rational, welfare-improving fiscal or regulatory 
interventions may exist. The beginnings of rigorous analytical underpinnings 
to a formal theory of financial market failure along these lines can be found 
in the work of Bernanke and Gertler [1987]. 
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section II develops the private 
consumption side of the model. Section III restates the necessary and 
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sufficient conditions for absence of debt neutrality in the OLG model under 
consideration. Section IV discusses the impact effect on saving of the social 
security retirement scheme first formalized by Saint-Paul [1990]. Section V 
introduces a very simple model of the supply side that is consistent with 
endogenous growth in an OLG setting. The structure of property rights, 
together with the technology, permits new generations to participate in the 
market game with endowments whose value increases in line with the growth 
rate.a 
In Section VI I investigate the effects of changes in the parameters 
characterizing tastes (the time preference rate, the elasticity of 
intertemporal substitution), demography (the birth rate, the age-dependent 
labor power depreciation rate and the death rate) and fiscal policy (public 
debt, labor income taxes, the parameters describing the unfunded social 
security retirement scheme, the tax rates on capital rental income and on 
interest income and exhaustive public consumption spending). Section VII 
concludes. 
(II) The deaand side of the ■odel. 
(a) Private consU11ption. 
Private consumption is given by the overlapping generations model of 
Blanchard [1985] and Veil [1990] as synthesized in Buiter [1988]. At each 
instant ta consumer born at times~ t solves the following optimum problem: 
4(1) max Et/: 1: c(s,v) 
1-1{exp[-p(v-t)]}dv P, 1 > 0
1 
{c(s,v)} 
c(s,v) > 0 for alls and for all v > s. 
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Subject to the budget identity 
(2) }i a(s,t) _ (r(t) + A)a(s,t) + i(s,t) - r(s,t) - c(s,t) 
and the solvency constraint 
f 
{3) lim a(s,f)exp{-/ [r(u) + A]du} = 0. 
f➔rn t 
Ve also have 
{4a) i(s,t) = w(s,t)J(s,t) 
(4b) w(s,t) = w(t) for alls 
{4c) j(s,t) = j(t,t)e-r(t-s) s ~ t 
Et is the expectation operator, conditional on information at time t. 
is the elasticity of instantaneous marginal utility or the reciprocal of the 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution: a larger value of 1 indicates a 
stronger desire to smooth consumption over time. pis the subjective rate of 
time preference, c(s,v) is consumption at time v by someone born at times, a 
denotes financial wealth, i is the individual's labor income, w is the wage 
rate or the rental rate of human capital, J is the amount of labor power {in 
efficiency units) applied by the individual, r is the amount of lump-sum taxes 
net of transfers on labor income and r is the real interest rate. Each 
consumer faces a time and age independent instantaneous probability of death, 
1 
7 
A~ 0. Everyone currently alive will therefore, regardless of age, have the 
same life expectancy 1/A. This is of course very poor demography and it also 
means that the theory cannot expect to capture most of the life cycle effects 
on saving. Human capital is homogeneous and its rental rate is the same for 
everyone currently alive {4b). Equation {4c) says that the human capital of a 
person born in periods equals that of a person born in period t times a 
factor e-~(t-s). This can be interpreted as aging leading to the erosion, at 
the constant exponential rate~, of the raw labor endowment of an individual. 
The term Aa on the right-hand side of equation (2) is due to the presence 
of efficient annuities markets. Consumers contract with annuities companies 
to receive a rate of return~ on their financial wealth at each instant. Vhen 
they die, their entire financial wealth goes to the annuity company. The 
annuities industry is competitive, risk neutral and has free entry. A is both 
the instantaneous probability of death and the fraction of each (large) age 
cohort {and therefore of the total population) that dies at each instant. The 
zero expected profit condition implies that~= A. 
I define human capital h{s,t) to be the present discounted value at time 
t (using the "risk-of-death-corrected" individual discount rater+ A) of 
expected future before-tax labor income of someone born at times< t. 
ro V 
{5a) li{s,t) =J x(s,v)(exp{-/ [r(u)+A]du})dv 
t t 
Similarly I define O(s,t) as the present discounted value, at time t, of 






(5b) O(s,t) =f r(s,v)e t dv 
. t 
Under rational expectations s, the solution to the consumer's problem is 
(6a) c(s,t) = n(t)[a(s,t) + h(s,t) - U(s,t)] 
CD 1 V 1 1 
(6b) n(t) = [f {exp -[(1::!)/ r(u)du + (v-t)(J + -p)]}dv]-
It t 'Y 
Note that this implies that: 
(6c) 6 
(b) Aggregation 
Vithout loss of generality I set 91(0), population at time zero, equal to 
1, that is 91(0) = 1. In addition to the constant death rate J ~ 0 there is a 
constant birth rate P ~ 0. The rate of growth of population n is therefore 
constant and given by n = P - A, that is 91(t) = e(P-J)t = ent. Note that, 
when P > O, total population at time t can be written as the sum of all 
t 
survivors of previous generations, that is 91(t) = pe-Atf ePsds. Raw labor 
-w 
power is assumed to decline with age at a constant proportional rate~. Let 
l(s,t) be the raw labor power supplied at time t by the surviving members of 
generations and n(s,t) the number of members of generations surviving at 
time t. It follows that l(s,t) = n(s,t)e-~(t-s) = pe[(P+~)s-(A+~)t] . 
Summing over all past generations yields the aggregate supply of raw labor 
9 
power, L(t), given in equation (7). 
(7) 
Corresponding to any individual flow or stock variable v(s,t) I define 




if p > O and V(t) =v(s,t)e-At if P = O. Special mention deserves 0(t), the 
present discounted value, at time t, of the expected life-time taxes to be 
paid by all those currently alive, which is given by 
-Ht- R 
(8) 0(t) =Pe J O(s,t)ePsds 
-a:, 
Lump-sum taxes (net of transfers) are assumed to vary with age in the 
following manner. Lump-sum taxes paid by a member of generations~ t, 
r(s,t), are the sum of an age-independent component, t0 and an age-dependent 
t2(t-s) component t1e which grows exponentially with age, as shown in equation 
(9). In order to obtain, for the study of long-run effects of tax changes in 
Section (IV), dynamic systems with an interesting steady state, it is also 
assumed that individual taxes include a "scale component" E(t), which for the 
moment I only require to be positive. 
(9) r(s,t) 
Provided P > t2 , a necessary condition for total tax receipts to be 
bounded, total tax revenue at each instant tis given by: 
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Since there are neither voluntary nor involuntary 7 bequests in our 
model, people are born without financial assets or liabilities, that is 
a(s,s) = 0. It follows that aggregate consumption is given by: 
(11) C(t) = n(t) [A(t) + H(t) - 0(t)] 
where n is defined in equation (6b) and 
. 
(12) A(t) = r(t)A(t) + X(t) - T(t) - C(t) 
. 
(13) H(t) = (r(t) + p + ~)H(t) - X(t) 
. 
(14) 0(t) = (r(t) + P)0(t) - T(t) - n(t) 
where 
(15) 
Integrating (13) forward, the aggregate human capital of those currently 
alive can be written as in equation (16a) and the aggregate tax burden faced 








(16b) 0(t) = / 
CD 
[T (V) + n ( V) ] e t dv 
t 
The term Tis present in the discount rate for human capital income in 
equation (16a) but not in the discount rate for future taxes in equation (16b) 
because the depreciation of raw labor power with age, at a constant rate T, 
only affects the before-tax component of labor income and not the tax bill. 
The term non the right-hand side of equations (14) and (16b) is present if 
and only if there are age-dependent lump-sum taxes, that is if both t1 and t2 
are non-zero and if the birth rate is positive. O(t) represents the 
contribution by those born at time t to the rate of change in the 
age-dependent component of the tax burden. 
Ignoring n for the moment, we see that H(t), the aggregate human capital 
of those currently alive, is the present discounted value of future after-tax 
wage income, where the discount rate is the real interest rate augmented by 
the birth rate .8 and the rate of labor power depreciation T. The presence of 
the birth rate signals that the future expected labor income of "new entrants" 
{those born after time t) is not owned by anyone currently alive. An 
operative intergenerational gift and bequest motive would cause the discount 
premium associated with .8 to disappear. So of cause would a zero birth rate 
or a different structure of labor property rights, such as a society in which 
all labor is performed by people subject to hereditary slavery 
(see Buiter [1989]). In the Blanchard-Weil OLG model an "owner-occupier" 
12 
system of labor property rights, taxation of labor income and a positive birth 
rate are necessary and sufficient for absence of debt neutrality. Uncertain 
lifetimes (A> 0) do not belong to the set of necessary and sufficient 
conditions. 
Equations (11) to (15) plus the definition of q in (6b) imply that the 
rate of change of aggregate consumption can be written as 
(17) 
(c) The government. 
At each instant t the government spends an amount G(t) ~ 0 on public 
consumptions, raises tax revenues T(t) and finances any excess of current 
outlays over current revenues by issuing fixed real market value, variable 
interest rate bonds. Monetary financing is not considered. The stock of 
these bonds is denoted B(t). The government budget identity is given in (18). 
Together with its solvency constraint, given in (19) it implies the 
governments intertemporal budget constraint given in (20): the current debt 
should equal the present discounted value of future primary (non-interest) 
surpluses. 
. 
(18) B(t) =r(t)B(t) + G(t) - T(t) 
f, 
(19) lim B(f)exp[-/ r(u)du] = 0. 
£-100 t 
OJ V 




Markets clear at each instant. In this closed economy real reproducible 
capital, K, and government debt are the only non-human stores of value. 
Financial market equilibrium therefore requires that (21) holds for all t. 
(21) A(t) = K(t) + B(t) 
Capital accumulation is governed by 
. 
(22) K=Y-R-C-G 
where Y is gross real output and o > 0 the instantaneous rate of depreciation 
of capital. 
(III) Debt neutrality. 
In this section I briefly review the necessary and sufficient condition 
for debt neutrality in our consumption model. None of the results of this 
Section depend on the model of production. 
I proceed as follows. Into the aggregate consumption function given in 
equation (11) we substitute for A using equation (21), for H using equation 
(16a) and fore using equation (16b). Then add and subtract the term 
w V 
/ G(v)exp{-/ [r(u)+P]du} and rearrange. This yields equation (23). When we 
t t 
replace this last step by the elimination of B(t) from the aggregate private 
consumption function using the public sector intertemporal budget constraint 
14 
(20), equation (24) results. For easy reference, the definition of n is 
reproduced as well. 
V V 
-/(r(u)+P+x)du -/(r(u)+P)du 
(23) C(t) = n(t) [K(t) + {CD[X(v)e t - G(v)e t ]dv] 
Z V 
CD t t CD -/ (r(q)+A-t )dq -/(r(u)+P)du
2+ n(t) [B(t)-/[T(v)-G(v)+Penvc,/_2t )/ f(z)e v dz]e t dv] 
t 2 V 
V V 
-/(r(u)+P+x)du -/ r(u)du 
(24) C(t) = n(t)[K(t) + {CD[X(v)e t - G(v)e t ]dv 
+ /{T(v) [eP(v-t) - 1] 
t 
V 
t t CD -/(r(q)+A-t )dq -/(r(u)+P)du ] 
- Penv[7/_2t ]/ t:(z)e v 2 dz}e t dv 
2 V 
CD 1 V 1 1 
n(t) = [/ {exp -[(1::.!.)/ r(u)du + (v-t)(A + -p)]}dv]-
It t 1 
From the government's intertemporal budget constraint given in equation 
(20) it is clear that the second term on the right-hand-side of equation (23) 
is identically equal to zero if and only if the birth rate P equals zero. 
When that is the case, government debt and the intertemporal distribution of 
lump-sum taxes do not influence private consumption behaviour. Ve are 
effectively (despite the possibility of a positive death rate) in a 
representative agent model. Debt neutrality breaks down if the intertemporal 
redistribution of lump-sum taxes associated with government borrowing 
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redistributes life-time resources between agents that are heterogeneous with 
respect to their consumption behaviour (see Buiter [1990]). Vhen P = 0 there 
are no new agents coming into the system. All those currently alive have the 
same life expectancy and the same marginal propensities to spend out of 
comprehensive wealth~-
The same conclusion is reached when I set P = 0 in equation (24). The 
third expression inside the big brackets on the right-hand-side of equation 
(24) disappears in that case. All that matters for aggregate consumption is 
the government's exhaustive spending program. 
(IV) An Unfunded Social Security Retire■ent Sche■e. 
Following Saint-Paul [1990], I can analyze the consequences of the 
introduction (or an increase in the scale of) an unfunded social security 
retirement scheme by introducing balanced-budget redistribution from the young 
to the old. Again, the results do not depend on the model of production. 
In this Section, I evaluate the impact effect on aggregate consumption of 
changes in the parameters characterizing the social security retirement 
scheme, holding constant the initial stocks of capital, K, and government 
debt, B, and the expected future paths of interest rates, r, and wage income, 
X, and exhaustive public spending, G.9 If aggregate consumption changes as a 
result of these parameter changes, there are likely to be consequences for the 
future behaviour of such endogenous variables as output, the capital stock, 
the wage rate and the interest rate. In Section VI a simple dynamic general 
equilibrium growth model will be used to evaluate the dynamic responses of 
these and other endogenous variables. 
Saint-Paul [1990] models an increase in the scale of an unfunded social 
16 
security retirement scheme as follows. 10 Vithout loss of generality consider 
the case where the init\al value of t1 is positive. Consider an increase in 
t1, the amount of tax paid by a newborn. This increase in taxes paid while 
young is accompanied by a change in the growth rate of the tax burden with 
age, t2, which is just sufficient to keep total tax receipts at each point in 
time constant. From equation (10) this implies that 
(25) 
Since P > t2 , an increase in t1, with t1 positive, requires a reduction in t2 
in order for total tax receipts to remain constant: pay more when young and 
less when old. 




i(s,t) =J r(s,v)e dv , the present discounted value, at time t, of 
t 





i(s,t) =t0Jf(v)e t 
-At t 
Therefore, 8(t) =Pe J i(s,t)ePsds, the present discounted value, at time 
-(I) 
t, of the expected life-time taxes to be paid by all those currently alive, is 
given by 
V V 
(I) -J(r(u)+A)du t a -f(r(u)+A-t2)du1/.J t
(26) e(t) = ent~of E(v)e t dv + (p _ t )J
(I) 
E(v)e dv] 
t 2 t 
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It is easily checked that the effect on 8(t) of an increase in t1 with t2 
reduced so as to keep T(t) constant is given by: 
V 
-J(r(u)+A-t2)dunt CD t
(27) d8(t) = -{3e J (v - t)f(v)e dv < 0err:-- t 
l dT(t)=O 
Balanced-budget redistribution from the young to the old therefore 
reduces the presented discounted value of the total future truces to be paid by 
those currently alive. Since all those currently alive have the same marginal 
propensities to spend out of comprehensive wealth, the result will be an 
increase in aggregate private consumption and a reduction in private saving. 
Since we are considering a balanced-budget operation, total private plus 
public saving also falls. 
(V) The supply side of the ■odel. 
To motivate the specification of the production side of the model it is 
necessary to remember that I am trying to construct the simplest possible 
competitive endogenous growth model with Yaari-Blanchard-Veil OLG 
demographics. I therefore want the aggregate production function to be linear 
in the aggregate capital stock, while the structure of property rights has to 
be such that in equilibrium new generations are born with endowments whose 
value rises at the endogenous rate of growth. Ve cannot achieve both 
objectives if the individual firm's production function were to be specified 
as linear in that firm's own capital stock, with no other essential scarce 
18 
inputs such as labor, that are typically assumed to be owned by new-born 
households, even in the absence of private intergenerational gifts. Ve would 
be hard pushed to think of a plausible property rights structure that would 
give the new generations a claim to some share of the capital stock in 
existence when they are born. One way to ensure that the newborn can join 
fully in the endogenous growth game is to allow workers to appropriate the 
quasi-rents created by an economy-production externality. This is the 
approach adopted here. 
The representative firm, i, produces a homogeneous output yi with a 
production function, given in equation (28), which is positive for positive 
inputs, increasing, constant returns to scale in its two inputs, physical 
capital, Ki and labor input in efficiency units Ji, strictly concave and at 
least twice continuously differentiable. I define ki =Ki/Ji. 
(28) y. =F(K., J.) =J.f(K./J.) = J.f(k.)
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
J., which measures the i th firm labor input in efficiency units, is the 
1 
product of Li, the quantity of raw labor power hired by firm i and E, the 
quality index of labor, which is the same for all firms. 11 I shall assume 
that, in the spirit of Sheshinski [1967], quality or efficiency is measured by 
the economy-wide capital-labor ratio. 12 The interpretation of "capital" should 
therefore probably rather broader than plant, equipment and structures. 
Extreme simplicity is the main virtue of this model. 
(29a) J. = EL. 
1 1 
(29b) E = K/L 
19 
N N 
where K =~ K. and L =~ L . 
. 1 1 . 1 1l= l= 
Firms hire workers and rent capital to maximize profits. They are price 
takers and also take f to be independent of their own choices of K.1 and L1.. 
This creates a positive externality in the private accumulation of capital and 
a negative externality in the use of labor. 13 Let w be the wage of raw labor 
power (say the rental rate of one hour of labor time, where the hours per 
worker can vary with age, as determined by the parameter~). It follows that 
The rental of a unit of efficiency labor, w, is of course given by: 
w = w/f = f(k.) - k.f'(k.)
1 1 1 
The private profit maximizing demand for capital is given by 
r = f' (k.) - 8 
1 
Here 6 ~ 0 is the constant exponential rate of depreciation of capital. 
N 
Letting Y = ~ y., I aggregate across all firms to get 
. 1 1l= 
N K
Y = ~ F(K. , rL -). Using the fact that all firms are identical and the 
. ·1 1 J., 1l= 
linear homogeneity of F(., .), the aggregate production function can be 
20 
written as 
Y = F(K, K) = Kf(1) 
Defining a= f(1) > 0, I can write aggregate output as linear in K 
(30) . Y = aK 
Note that the social return to an additional unit of physical capital is 
given by a - b = f(1) - b, while the private gross marginal product of 
capital, which I shall denote a', is given by a'= f'(1) < f(1) =a. Private 
capital accumulation does not allow for the non-appropriable benefit of 
raising the average quality of the labor force. In this model, the interest 
rate and the real wage are fixed by technology and constant: 
(31) r = f'(1) - b = a' - b 
(32) w = f(1) - f'(1) = a - a' 
Since the economy is not viable if the net social marginal product of 
capital is negative, I assume: 
The net private marginal product of capital can either be positive or 
negative. 
Note that this specification of the production technology would avoid a 
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problem, signaled by Jones and Manuelli [1990] that can arise in 
finite-lifetime (Samuelson-Diamond) OLG models of endogenous growth. They 
consider a model where the one-sector technology of production in principle 
permits endogenous growth. The consumers' side of the model is the standard 
two-period Samuelson-Diamond OLG model without intergenerational gifts and 
bequests, in which the young have a positive endowment of labor that is 
constant from generation to generation. Growth peters out in the long run 
because the young generation does not have enough resources to purchase an 
ever increasing capital stock from the old. Our equations (28) and (29a,b) 
rule out this problem. The value of the labor endowment per worker, which is 
constant in physical units, is augmented one-for-one with the aggregate 
physical capital stock, which increases the efficiency of this physical 
quantity of labor. 
In the Yaari-Blanchard-Veil OLG model of this paper, there is of course 
no life-cycle pattern of saving. Since everyone, regardless of age, has the 
same remaining expected lifetime (which may be infinite), the young have the 
same marginal propensity to consume out of wealth, n, as the old. The Jones 
and Manuelli problem does show up in another form, h~wever. Alogoskoufis and 
van der Ploeg [1990a,b, 1991] used the same aggregate production function, 
given in equation (30) as is used in this paper. The individual firm's 
production function however, was given by yi = F(Ki, K/N) , i = 1, ... ,N, with 
F linear homogeneous. There is an externality in the use of capital, because 
each individual firm takes the average capital stock (per firm) K/N as 
independent of its ow choice of K.. There is no labor input in the
1 
production function. 
In the description of their model Alogoskoufis and van der Ploeg do not 
include labor among the productive inputs or endow new generations at birth 
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with labor or with any other claims on resources that would give them a stake 
in the economy, let alone a stake that grows in value at the rate required to. 
sustain endogenous growth. In terms of our model of consumption, h(t,t) = O, 
and the newborn cannot get into the game. 14 The model also cannot explain how 
those already in the game, who own the capital stock, ever got to own any 
capital if they started off at birth without any claim on valuable scarce 
resources.15 The problem is one of property rights assignment. Fortunately, 
they then proceed as if workers are born endowed with claim on an equal per 
capita share of the marginal product of K/N. This makes their model 
effectively equivalent to the one of this paper. 
In Buiter and Kletzer [1991a,b] which develops an endogenous growth model 
with a Samuelson-Diamond (3-period) OLG demographic structure, the endowment 
of the young grows at a rate sufficient so sustain endogenous growth, but 
through a different mechanism. Equations (28) and (29a) are kept, but 
~ e 
equation (29b) is replaced by something like ~ = {(j_i, . , . ) {1 > 0. f f f 
may be interpreted as the economy-wide stock of useful knowledge; e. are the 
J 
resources (education and training) spent by the j th household to augment its 
own knowledge and skills. There again is an externality because each 
household ignores the effect of its own education and training on E, and thus 
on the productivity of other households currently alive or yet to be born (E 
does not die when the households that contributed to it die: human capital may 
die but the stock of useful knowledge survives unscathed). This two capital 
goods structure permits endogenous growth. 16 
The impossibility of dynamic inefficiency. 
From equation (22) we get 
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. 
I/K = a - 6 - C/K - G/K 
The growth rate of capital is, since C and Gare non-negative, never 
higher than the net social marginal product of capital. This economy, with 
its linear technology is therefore never dynamically inefficient. 17 Clearly, a 
necessary condition for dynamic inefficiency is that the marginal product of 
capital be able to fall below the average product. Vith output linear in the 
capital stock, the social marginal and average products of capital are always 
equal to each other and constant. 1s 
(VI) Saving and long-run growth. 
To simplify the exposition, I shall start the analysis in this Section 
with the case of age-independent labor power(~= 0) and age-independent taxes 
(t1 = 0 or t2 = 0). Since capital is the natural "scale variable" of this 
economy, I shall consider the behavior over time of the growth rate of 
capital, of consumption per unit of capital, C/K =c, and of public debt per 
unit of capital, B/K =b. In order for the system to have steady states, I 
will treat government consumption per unit of capital, G/K =g, and lump-sum 
taxes per unit of capital, T/K =7, as the policy instruments . 
. 
Let '#.% =K/K. From equations (17), (18), (21), (22), (30), (31) and 
(32), I obtain the following system of equations, familiar from the work of 
Alogoskoufis and van der Ploeg [1990a,b]: 
(33) '#.% = a - 0 - g - C 
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. 
(35) b = (a' - a+ g)b + g - r + cb 
Note that, since r is constant, ~ is also constant and given by 
(36) 
I first consider the case where there is no public debt outstanding, 
b = O, and the budget is balanced continuously through endogenous variations 
r. 19in the ratio of lump-sum, age-independent taxes to aggregate capital, 
In this case the dynamics of the system is captured by a single quadratic 
differential equation in consumption per capita: 
2
(37) ~ = -~P + [1-1(a' - 8 - p) + n - a+ 8 + g]c + c 
. 
Figure 1a shows the parabola representing equation (37) in c-c space, referred 
to henceforth as the consumption parabola. There are two stationary 
* 
equilibria, one for a positive value of c (shown as c1) and one for a negative 
* value (shown as c2). 
Only the positive stationary equilibrium is economically meaningful. 
* 
Note that c is a non-predetermined state variable and that c1 is an unstable 
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equilibrium. Figure 1b graphs the inverse (with slope -1) linear relationship 
between '1x and c given in equation (33), referred to henceforth as the capital 
growth line. The minimum of the parabola need not be for positive value of c. 
Even if the economy is viable (a> 6), the intercept of the line 
'#x= a - 6 - g - c in Figure 1b, could be negative for sufficiently large 
value of g. Even when the intercept is positive, the common steady state 
growth rate of capital, output and consumption can be negative, as shown in 
Figure 1b. 
A balanced-budget increase in public cons1111ption. 
Vhen there is a balanced-budget increase in public consumption, the 
capital growth line shifts down vertically by the increase in g (as shown in 
Figure 2a), and the consumption parabola shift up and to the left, reducing 
the long-run equilibrium value of c. As shown in Figure 2b, the effect on the 
long-run growth rate of capital is unambiguously negative: while the long-run 
consumption/capital ratio falls, it falls by less than the increase in the 
government consumption/capital ratio. 
* yo > dc1 = -0.5{1 + 0 5} > -1 ag [T 2 + 417,8] ' 
Y = ,-1(a'-6-p)+n-a+6+g 
This result, that an increase in public consumption crowds out capital 
formation as well as private consumption is different from the result that 
would have been obtained in the representative agent version of the model (the 
special case where ,8 = 0). Vhen ,8 = O, government consumption only crowds out 
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private consumption in the long run, leaving capital formation unchanged. 
More generally, in the r~presentative agent model, any unanticipated, 
immediate permanent increase in public consumption causes an equal reduction 
in private consumption, in the short run as well as in the long run. Note 
. 
from equation (37) that when P = O, the c equation is homogeneous. There is 
* a trivial stationary solution (c2= 0) and a sensible stationary solution 
* 4 * 4(c1 = -[1 (a'-8-p)-A-a+o+g] and 1.x= 1 (a'- 8 - p) - A). Note that since 
the interest rate (which equals the private rate of return to capital) and the 
time preference rate both are exogenous and constant, they will not in general 
be equal to each other. From equation (6c) the rate of growth of individual 
consumption will, in and out of steady state be equal to 1-1(a'- 8 - p). 
Returning to the case with a positive birth rate, the transition to the 
new stationary equilibrium will be instantaneous if the increase in g is 
unanticipated and permanent. With K predetermined at the moment of the fiscal 
*O *1shock, the decline inc from to must be due to a fall in the level ofc1 c1 
consumption. Afterwards the rate of growth of aggregate consumption equals 
the new lower rate of growth of capital. If public spending is not 
intrinsically valued, this increase in public spending constitutes an 
unambiguous worsening of welfare. 
If the announcement date of the increase in public consumption (t0) 
precedes the implementation date (t1), the behaviour over time of c and f .x 
is as shown in Figure 3a,b. Starting from a stationary equilibrium at c;o 
with a capital growth rate r;~ the level of consumption jumps to a lower 
level (a point such as n1 in Figure 3a) immediately (at t 0) when the 
unexpected news about the future higher taxes associated with the future 
higher public spending arrives. Note that this initial decline in consumption 
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is smaller than when the policy change is immediate (t0 = t 1). Between the 
announcement date (t0) and the implementation date (t1) the level of 
consumption per unit of capital moves continuously from n1 to n2. At the 
implementation date t 1 , the level of c is at its new steady state value and 
its rate of change jumps from the negative value at n2 to zero. The rate of 
growth of the capital increases at the announcement date from 1~to the 
value of 1xat n1 in Figure 3a. Between the announcement date and the 
implementation date 1xcontinuous to rise. At t 1 the system has reached 
point n2 and the rate of growth of the capital stock declines to its new, 
lower long run equilibrium value. 
An increase in the ti■e preference rate. 
For reasons of space I henceforth only consider unanticipated 
announcements of immediate permanent shocks. As shown in Figure 4a,b an 
increase in the pure rate of time preference leaves the capital growth line in 
Figure 4b unaffected while the consumption parabola in Figure 4a shifts down 
everywhere. With the unanticipated permanent shock, the transition to the new 
higher steady state level of consumption per unit of capital and lower steady 
state growth rate of capital is immediate. Greater impatience results in more 
consumption in the short run but less growth and consumption in the long run.20 
A higher birth rate. 
As shown in Figure 5a,b an increase in p leaves the capital growth line 
unchanged and shifts the consumption parabola up.21 The new long-run 
equilibrium has a higher growth rate and a lower consumption-capital ratio. 22 
When the increase in the birth rate is unexpected, immediate and permanent, 
the transition to the new steady state is immediate.23 
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! reduction in life expectancy.. 
Figure 4a,b can also serve (qualitatively) to illustrate the effects of 
an increase in A, the instantaneous probability of death. As expected, 
shorter horizons boost the long-run consumption/capital ratio and reduce 
long-run growth.24 The capital growth line does not shift and the consumption 
parabola shifts down.25 If the reduction in life expectancy is unanticipated, 
immediate and permanent, the transition to the new steady state will be 
immediate. 
Note that when the birth rate and the death rate increase by equal 
amounts, keeping the rate of growth of population constant, the model predicts 
a net reduction in the saving rate. Long-run consumption per unit of capital 
increases and the growth rate of the capital stock decreases: 
* * ac1 ac1 -1 2 --0 5or+ or= (n + P){[1 (a'-o-p)+n-a+o+g] + 4nP} • 
An increase in the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. 
It is obvious that the capital growth line is unaffected by the 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution 1/1. From equations (36) and (37) we 
obtain that: 
. 
Bel = (P + c)(a' - o + p) 
~ c given 
The consumption parabola will shift up (down) if the private return to capital 
a' - 6 = r exceeds (is below) the subjective time preference rate p. From 
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equation (6c) we know that if r > p, individual consumption is low but rising. 
If lrss importance is attached to the smoothing of consumption over time (1/7 
increases), we should expect to move to an equilibrium with a lower level but 
a higher growth rate of consumption.26 This is the case where the consumption 
parabola shifts up, as in Figure 5a. If the change is unanticipated and 
permanent, the transition to the new steady state with its lower value of c 
and its higher value of 1xwill be instantaneous. 
Capital rental taxes. 
A tax (Kon the rental income of capital (with the revenue returned as 
equal per capita lump-sum transfers to all those currently alive) changes the 
arbitrage condition equating the returns on bonds to the returns from owning 
capital to 
An increase in the capital income tax rate (K is therefore equivalent in our 
model to a reduction in a' with a unchanged. The tax leaves the before-tax 
private marginal product of capital (and the social marginal product of 
capital) unchanged, and reduces the after-tax private rate of return to 
capital one-for-one. It is clear that an increase in (K does not shift the 
capital growth line. Its effect on the consumption parabola is given by: 
. 
ac I = (1 - l )P - lea, 1 1
Kc given 
In the frequently analyzed logarithmic utility case (1 = 1) the 
consumption parabola shifts down, as in Figure 4a,b, raising long-run c and 
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reducing long-run '#x For this result to be reversed and the consumption 
1parabola to shift up, it must be true that 1- < p ~ c 27 
An increase in the capital rental tax rate (K does two things. First, it 
reduces the after-tax return to capital corresponding to any given pre-tax 
rate of return. Because of our linear technology the before-tax rate of 
return is fixed, so the after-tax rate of return and the rate of interest 
decline one-for-one with the increase in (K. Second, it transforms capital 
income into lump-sum transfer payments to all those currently alive. By doing 
so it redistributes, at time t, some income from those born before time t, who 
own the capital and pay the capital income tax, to those born at time t, who 
own only their human capital plus the present discounted value of the net 
future lump-sum transfers they receive. In the representative agent special 
case of our model (P = 0), the redistribution effect is absent. There is just 
an (income-compensated) reduction in the rate of interest. The substitution 
effect of the lower rate of interest will shift down the consumption parabola, 
thus raising the long-run value of c and reducing the growth rate of capital. 
'When Pis positive, the newborn receive a bonus from the older generations 
when (K increases. They do not own any capital on which to pay capital income 
tax. If the elasticity of intertemporal substitution 1/7 is small (less than 
1), the (negative) income effect on current consumption of the lower interest 
rate they face as a result of the increase in (K will_ dominate the 
substitution effect and they will save more. It is conceivable that this 
effect dominates the increase in consumption by the older generations. This 
is essentially the point made by Engel and Kletzer [1990] in the context of an 
open economy OLG model with tariff revenues redistributed as a residence-based 
wealth subsidy. 
Considering taxes on interest income (r does not add to the analysis, as 
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the marginal private and social products of capital are unaffected. The 
before-tax interest rate would rise to offset the interest tax and leave the 
after-tax rate of interest unchanged. The newborn too will face an unchanged 
rate of interest. Since they have the same marginal propensity to spend out 
of comprehensive wealth as the older generations, there will be no effect on 
aggregate consumption. 
An unfunded social security retirement scheme. 
To study the long-run growth effects of the unfunded social security 
retirement scheme discussed in Section IV, I set~= g = 0 and consider 
balanced budget schemes with B =0. I define: 
w =fl/K 
From equations (15), (29b) and (31) 
(3t1t2 wffitv -( a'-8+(3-t2 ) (v-t) 
(39) w(t) = JJ _ t / t e dv 
2 t 
Note that the scale variable in the tax function ,e , is given bye= K/L. 
The equations of motion and the capital growth equation for this case are 
given in equations (40) through (42). 
(42) '#X = a - 8 - c 
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Note that the forward-looking integral in equation (39) exists only if 
r + /3 - t2 exceeds the growth rate of capital 'j..%' in steady state. Also, w 
cannot change sign for given t1 and t 2. In what follows I only consider small 
changes in t1 and t2 that do not change their signs. For reasons of space, I 
shall look only at the case where both t1 and t2 are positive, which implies 
that w is always positive . 
. 
Thew= 0 locus is given by 
(43) c = a' - a C ~ 0 
This is the truncated (for c ~ 0 and w > 0) rectangular hyperbola shown 
in Figure 6a through 6d. Its vertical asymptote is the vertical axis (w = 0) 
and its horizontal asymptote is a' - a+ /3 - t2. There is no solution to this 
equation for positive values of both c and w unless a' - a+ f3 - t2 > O. I 
assume this to be the case in Figures 6a through 6d and 7. 
The c = 0 locus is the "parabola on its side", shown in Figures 6a 
through 6d and in Figure 7, given by 
2(44) c + [r-1(a' - o - p) + n - a+ o]c + ~(w - /3) = O. 
On this locus, when c = O, w = p. To obtain real solutions for c, we 
require w 5 P + [r-1(a' - o - p) + n - a+ o] 2/4n. 
[ -1 2 1 -1(l.7hen W = p + 1 (a'-o-p) + n-a+o] /4~ , C = - ~[7 a' - 0 - p) + n - a+ o]. 
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-1 2 t1t2 
Unless fi + [1 (a' - 8 - p) + n - a+ 8] /4~ ~ (p-t )(a'-a+p-t ) , no 
2 2 
stationary solution with positive values for c and b exists. This case is 
shown in Figure 6d. In the rest of this subsection I assume this condition is 
satisfied, so one or two stationary solutions with positive values for both w 
and c exist. From equation (44) the two solutions for care given by 
1 
c = ½[-[1-1(a'-8-p)+n-a+8] : {[1-1(a'-8-p)+n-a+8] 2-4n(w-fi))}~ 
The long run effect on c and w of an increase in t1 with t2 adjusting 
according to equation (25) so as to maintain total tax receipts unchanged, 
yields: 
fi - t ade _ A-1 [ 2 /J ](45a) of -Ll { +;;-~
1 dT=O 1 
(45b) 
1 
(45c) + n - a + 8] 2 - 4n(w - fi)]}2 
At a stationary equilibrium (c* , w *), the non-linear equations of motion. 
can be approximated by the following system of linear differential equations 
with constant coefficients: 
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(46) 
Since both state variables, c and w, are non-predetermined, a unique 
stationary equilibrium which is unstable would guarantee a unique continuously 
convergent solution. Such a configuration is shown in Figure 6a. Note that A 
is the determinant of the coefficient matrix on the right-hand side of 
equation (46). If the configuration of the stationary equilibrium is locally 
completely unstable, then A will be positive. Vhen the stationary equilibrium 
is on the downward-sloping segment of the c = 0 locus, (as at n in Figures 6a) 
is is always completely unstable. Vhen the stationary equilibrium is on the 
upward-sloping part of the c = 0 locus, it can still be completely unstable, 
provided that the c = 0 locus has a steeper slope that thew= 0 locus. 
Equilibria such as n in Figure 6b and n1 in Figure 6c fall in this category. 
A stationary equilibrium such as n2 in Figure 6c, where the positive slope of 
the c = 0 locus is less than the slope of thew= 0 locus corresponds to a 
negative value of A. The equilibrium is a saddlepoint, and there is a 
(one--0imensional) continuum of initial conditions from which the system will 
converge to that stationary equilibrium. 
Vhen A is positive, one sees from equation (45a) that the new stationary 
equilibrium value of c increases when t1 is increased and t2 reduced in a 
balanced-budget manner (when there is an increase in the size of the unfunded 
. 
social security retirement scheme). Graphically, thew locus shifts up when 
t1 is increased and t2 reduced with total taxes receipts constant. Figure 7 
35 
shows how, when the equilibrium is a completely unstable one on the 
down-ward-sloping segment of the c = 0 locus, w decreases across steady states 
as c increases. \Then the completely unstable equilibrium lies on the 
upward-sloping segment of the c = O locus (as at n in Figure 6b or n1 in 
Figure 6c) the increase in the scale of the unfunded social security 
retirement scheme increases w along with c.2s 
\Then the stationary equilibrium is unique and completely unstable, the 
transition to the new steady state following an unexpected, immediate and 
permanent increase in the scale of the unfunded social security retirement 
scheme will be instantaneous. 
Finally, from the capital growth equation we again note that, as always 
except for the case where exhaustive public spending is raised, the decline in 
the growth rate of capital equals the increase inc. 
Deficit financing of a tax cut 
The last case I consider will be the debt financing of a temporary cut in 
lump-sum taxes. For simplicity I again set~= t1 = tt = 0. The public 
spending/capital ratio g is also set equal to zero. There now are two state 
variables, c and b, whose behavior is governed by equations (47) and (48). 
(47) c = -~fi(l + b) + [1-1(a' - 8 - p) + n - a+ o]c + c2 
(48) b = (a' - a+ c)b - r 
Note that, with r exogenous, the possibility of unstable public debt 
dynamics is built into the model. Since a' < a, a larger value of the level 
of the public debt/capital ratio, b, will be associated with a larger negative 
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rate of change of the public debt/capital ratio, b, for small values of c 
(that is for large values of '#..JJ· For large values of c (for low or 
negative values of '#..,J, however, larger values of bare associated with 
. 
larger positive values of b. Clearly, with T exogenous, instability is in the 
air. 29 
For illustrative purposes I consider a tax function that always causes 
the public-debt/capital ratio to converge to a unique stationary equilibrium 
value. It is given in equation (49). 
(49) T =To+ cb 
In addition to the exogenous component TO (assumed constant), there is an 
endogenous component which exactly offsets the term cb in equation (48). Vith 
this tax function, the debt dynamics are now governed by: 
(50) b = (a' - a)b - To 
Since the constant private marginal product of capital a' is always less 
than the private (and public) average product of capital a, b always converges 
* monotonically to its long-run equilibrium value b given by 
The c = 0 locus is unaffected by the nature of the fiscal rule. It is 
given by the non-negative solutions to 
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In uJ, c space, this is again a parabola "on its side". Economically the 
only interesting case is where b ~ -1. Since K ~ O, b = -1 implies B = -K ~ 
0. The total value of all productive resources in this economy is K. 'When B 
= -K, the government (as net lender to the private sector) effectively owns 
the entire stock of productive resources in the economy. The government 
clearly cannot lend more than that in this closed system, as there are no 
remaining private resources against which these loans can be secured. With b 
~ -1, there is one positive stationary solution given by 
1 
(52) c = ½[-[1-1(a'-8-p)+n-a+8] + {[1-1(a'-8-p)+n-a+8] 2+4~P(1+b)}~ 
In b-c space, the c = 0 locus, shown in Figure 8, starts at b = -1 and c = 0. 
For b > -1, c increases monotonically with b, but at a decreasing rate. In 
the limit as b goes to infinity, the slope of the locus goes to zero. 
The b = 0 locus is vertical in b-c space. Since we only consider values 
of b greater than -1, it follows from equation (51) that we require 
If this restriction is satisfied, there will be a unique stationary 
equilibrium, fl, in Figure 8. Locally, the system near fl is a saddlepoint. 
Since there is one predetermined state variable band one non-predetermined 
state variable c, this means that there will only be one continuously 
convergent solution. For a given value of r0 , SS is the unique convergent 
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saddlepath. The "most divergent" solution trajectory UU coincides with the 
b = 0 curve. All soluti~n trajectories other than SS will have an asymptote 
at UU (even though this may take them into the infeasible c < 0 region). 
Figure 9a,b shows the response of c, band 1.x, the growth rate of the 
capital stock, to an unanticipated permanent reduction in r0 . Since 
government exhaustive spending is unchanged, all this amounts to, (as can be 
seen from the government intertemporal budget constraint given in equation 
(20)), is a postponement of taxes that are constant in present discounted 
value (using the real interest rater as the discount rate). Because the 
private sector effectively discounts at r + P (since new tax payers will be 
born who will share part of the burden of the postponed taxes), this 
intertemporal redistribution of taxation is also an intergenerational 
redistribution of taxation that leaves those currently alive better off. 
Starting from an initial stationary equilibrium at n in Figure 9b, the 
level of consumption immediately increases to n01 , the point on S'S', the 
convergent saddlepath through the new long-run equilibrium fl', that lies 
vertically above n in Figure 9b. In Figure 7a this corresponds to a 
discontinuous reduction in the growth rate of capital and output, from n to 
n01 . After the initial jump-increase in consumption, the consumption/capital 
ratio and the debt/capital ratio increase continuously along the convergent 
saddlepath S'S' towards their new long-run equilibrium values at n,. The 
capital growth rate declines continuously from n01 in Figure 9a ton,. This 
confirms the results obtained by Alogoskoufis and van der Ploeg [1990a,b]. 
As demonstrated in Saint-Paul [1990], alternative consumption 
trajectories supported by different intertemporal redistributions of taxation 
cannot be Pareto-ranked. Government borrowing, with debt serviced through 
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lump-sum taxation (or balanced-budget redistribution schemes using lump-sum 
taxes and transfers such as the unfunded social security retirement scheme 
analyzed earlier) merely redistributes intergenerationally. Postponing 
taxation by borrowing favors current over future generations, but there are no 
efficiency issues involved. This may seem surprising, since we are in a 
second-best world: the private return on capital a' - 6 is below the social 
return a - 6. This inefficiency, however, is not affected in any way by the 
intergenerational redistribution effected by the government through borrowing 
or through unfunded social security retirement schemes. 
(VII) Conclusion. 
If the production technology of the economy (broadly defined) permits 
endogenous growth, one obvious lesson is that fiscal policy changes and 
changes in the parameters that govern private behavior can have long-run 
growth rate effects as well as long-run level effects. The welfare implications 
of this "magnification" of the effects of exogenous shocks on the growth rate 
are not as straightforward as the positive implications. As was pointed out 
by Saint-Paul [1990], balanced-budget redistribution towards the old and 
deficit financing of tax cuts (even age-independent tax cuts) will reduce the 
long-run growth rates of capital, output and consumption. As long as the 
taxes involved are lump-sum, however, the trajectory with the lower growth 
rate will not be Pareto-dominated by that with the higher growth rate. There 
is intergenerational redistribution, from the future generations towards the 
present ones, but no free lunches are being served or taken away. 
Against that, of course, it should be pointed out that the magnitude of 
the intergenerational redistribution associated with a given policy change is 
enhanced in endogenous growth models. Reasonable social welfare functions may 
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suggest policies more favorable to a higher savings rate, if the returns to 
saving and accumulation are. bounded away from zero sufficiently strongly to 
permit endogenous growth. In any case, even if the efficiency consequences of 
policy are not magnified, the distributional consequences will be. Policy is 
therefore likely to matter more in endogenous growth models than in exogenous 
growth models. 
A second lesson emerges as a by-product of one of the less attractive 
features of the one-sector endogenous growth model used in this paper: the 
constancy of the real interest rate. In this model, as in the "Unpleasant 
Monetarist Arithmetic" model of Sargent and Vallace [1984], there is financial 
crowding out: government borrowing reduces total national saving and, in a 
closed economy, displaces private capital formation. So does an increase in 
the scale of the social security retirement scheme. Still, there is no 
movement of interest rates in response to the policy changes (or changes in 
private behavior) that cause the financial crowding out. In the world of our 
model, those who view financial crowding out as mediated necessarily through 
higher real interest rates would fail to identify the effect of government 
financing on private capital formation. 
A third lesson is mainly for educators: the analysis of the response of 
economic growth to a variety of private or government shocks is considerably 
more straightforward when the economy is represented by the simplest 
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1In the standard expected utility framework with a time-separable utility 
function, the precautionary saving motive is governed by the third derivative 
of the instantaneous utility function. 
2Note, however, that the existence of permanent effects on the growth 
rates of capital, output and consumption does not automatically imply the 
existence of large efficiency effects. In Section VI we shall see examples 
where public policy permanently affects the growth rate, but the alternative 
growth paths cannot be Pareto-ranked. There will be large welfare effects, 
but these take the form of intergenerational redistributions of welfare. 
3In the finite-horizon OLG model of Samuelson and Diamond, this 
specification of technology and property rights means that the problem flagged 
by Jones and Manuelli [1990], that the value of the endowment of the young may 
not keep up with the value of the capital owned by the old (which the young 
are supposed to purchase from the old in equilibrium), will not occur. A 
richer specification of technolgy and property rights that achieves the same 
purpose was used by Buiter and Kletzer [1991a,b]. In the age-independent time 
horizon OLG model of the current paper, the life-cycle issues emphasized by 
Jones and Manuelli are absent. The problem of ensuring that the new 
generations are endowed with scarce resources whose value can grow at an 
endogenously determined rate remains, however. 
41 = 1 corresponds to the case of log utility. 
5The only uncertainty modeled explicitly is the uncertainty concerning the 
time of one's demise. Consumers born at times are assumed to know that the 
probability of surviving till time t ~sis e-A(t-s). This term augments the 
subjective discount factor, which becomes e-(p+A)(v-t) for someone 
discounting, at time t, the utility of consuming at time v ~ t. The model can 
then be treated as a perfect foresight model. 
6Note that n= n{n - [('-1)r +A+ !p]}. In steady state this gives a 
1 1 
non-zero solution n = (1~1)r +A+ ~p. In the logarithmic utility case 
(, = 1) this reduces ton= p + A, both in and out of steady state. 
7The absence of involuntary or unintended bequests is due to the 
assumption of perfect annuities markets. 
8Government capital formation is not considered. Public consumption 
either is intrinsically useless or, if useful, enters the private utility 
function in an additively separable manner. 
9Ve shall also consider the effects of changes in G and B. 
10Saint-Paul considers a "twisting" of the wage-age profile, that is a 
larger value of~ combined with a higher value of the starting wage at age 
zero. Vhat we do in this paper is equivalent in terms of its impact effect on 
the savings rate. 
11Note that c is also the scale factor applied to the tax function given in 
equation (9). This permits a well-behaved steady-state to exist in the model 
but has no other significance. 
44 
12Sheshinski [1967] actually suggested using the economy-wide stock of 
physical capital as the index of labor efficiency, not the economy-wide 
capital-labor ratio. Using this alternative specification would of course 
generate a model with unbounded static increasing returns to scale, something 
we do not wish to contemplate even at this level of abstraction. Romer [1986] 
and Lucas [1988] developed models with increasing static returns to scale in 
which the quality of labor is augmented not by the accumulation of physical 
capital but rather by accumulation of knowledge and skills. 
13The private marginal product of capital is a' - 8 and the social marginal 
product of capital a - 8. The private marginal product of labor is a - a', 
its social marginal product is zero. 
14Unless the government tranfers resources to them, by making O(t,t) 
positive. 
150ne way to endow the newborn with capital at birth is for the government 
to make a capital transfer to them or for the government to commit itself 
credibly to a future sequence of current transfer payments. 
16An attractive feature of this model is that it does not imply a constant 
real interest rate. 
17Note, however, that it is not Pareto efficient because of the capital 
stock (or labor) externality. 
1BVe owe this point to Olivier Blanchard. It is spelled out formally in 
Saint-Paul [1990]. 
19Note that while the ratio of aggregate taxes on labor income to the 
aggregate capital stock varies endogenously, each individual private agent 
takes the amount he pays in taxes on labor income to be independent of his 
individual accumulation of capital. The tax therefore remains a lump-sum tax 
on labor income and does not become a capital income tax. 
* 
20:pcl = 0_51-l{l _ [1-
1
(a'-8-p) + n - a+ 8 + g - 2P] } > 0 
uu {[1-l(a'-8-p) + n - a+ 8 + g]2 + 4nP}0.5 
. 
21From equation (37) we obtain that; . = -n + c . From the 
c given 
aggregate consumption function we know that C = n(A + H - 0) . Since A= K 
in our case we have c = n(l +HK 8 ). If human capital net of the present 
discounted value of taxes on human capital is non-negative, then c > n. Ve 
assume this condition to hold. 
* ac r -1 ( l2~1 = 0.5{-1 +21a'-8-p) + n - a+ 8 + g2+ 2~ 0 5} 
{[1 (a'-8-p) + n - a+ 8 + g] + 4~P} · 
(n - c){[1-1(a'-8-p) + n - a+ 8 + g] 2 + 4~P}-0. 5 < 0 provided human 
capital is positive. 
45 
23An increase in the rate at which labor power decays with age, ~, has 
exactly the same effect on c as an increase in the birth rate. 
* 
2/c1 _ O 5{1 -r,-1(a'-8-p) + n - a + 8 + g - 2P] } 
1JI - · + {[,-1(a'-8-p) + n - a+ 8 + g] 2 + 4nP}0·5 
. 
25From equation {37) it follows that~, . =-(P + c) < 0. 
c given 
* 
ocl -1 2 -0 526ofl = (c + P)(a' - 8 - p){[, (a'-8-p) + n - a+ 8 + g] + 4nP} · . 
27Let the consumption/output ratio be 0.8 and the annual capital-output
ratio 3.3. This means that c =0.24. With P =0.01, the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution would have to be less than 0.04 for the consumption
parabola to shift up instead of down as the capital income tax rate increases. 
Those who pretend to know about these things, argue that this is too low a 
number. Halving or doubling the birth rate doesn't change that conclusion. 
28Note that when A is negative, as at n2 in Figure Sd, the increase in the 
scale of the social security retirement scheme reduces c and w. 
29Even with r exogenous, the model is not necessarily badly behaved 
everywhere. There can e.g. be a stationary equilibrium with a relatively
small value of c and a negative value of b that constitutes, locally, a 
. 
saddlepoint. The b = 0 locus in c-b space is a rectangular hyperbola with 
equation c = a - a'+ b-1r. Note that c ~ 0 is equivalent to i ~ a' - a< 0. 
Negative values of bare therefore certainly not ruled out. In the following
Figures A and B some possible configurations are shown. Fugure A is for a 
positive value of r. There always is a high c stationary equilibrium, with a 
positive value of b , n1, that is completely unstable. There may also be a 
low c equilibrium with a negative value of b, n2, that is a saddlepoint. This 
will occur if : > -1. A higher value of r will raise the value of c
0 - a . 
(lower the value of K/K) at the high c equilibrium (n1) by shifting up the 
. 
positive segment of the b = 0 schedule. It will lower the value of c (raise 
. 
K/K) at the the low c equilibrium (n2) by shifting down the negative segment 
. 
of the b = 0 schedule. In Figure B, r is negative. As shown in the Figure,
there may be no stationary equilibrium with a positive value of c. If there 
are two equilibria (not shown), they will both have the same sign for b. All 
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